UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-24-2009

State v. Jockumsen Appellant's Brief Dckt. 34581

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Jockumsen Appellant's Brief Dckt. 34581" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1937.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1937

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

MICHAEL L. JOCKUMSEN,

)
)

NO. 34581

j

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

\

Defendant-Appellant.

-.

.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BANNOCK
HONORABLE RONALD BUSH
District Judge
MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of ldaho
I.S.B. # 4843
SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. # 5867

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

SARAH E. TOMPKINS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. # 7901
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ldaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................................ 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... I
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. .2
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ..................................................................... 8
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 9
I. The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Violated
Mr. Jockumsen's Fifth Amendment Privilege Against
Self-IncriminationAnd I.C. § 18-215, When It Improperly
Used Information Obtained For Purposes Of Determining
Mr. Jockumsen's Competency At Sentencing ............................................ 9
A. Introduction ........................................................................................... 9
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Violated
Mr. Jockumsen's Fifth Amendment Rights Against
Self-IncriminationAnd I.C. § 18-215, When It
Considered Statements Made By Mr. Jockumsen,
And Diagnoses That Were Made Based Upon
His Statements, In Aggravation At ...................................................... I 0
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Violated
Mr. Jockumsen's Fifth Amendment Rights Against
Self-Incrimination and I.C. § 18-215, When The Court
Failed To Remove Mr. Jockumsen's Competency
Evaluations That Were Improperly Included Within
The Presentence Investigation Report ................................................ 12

II. The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Acted In
Manifest Disregard of I.C.R. 32 and I.C. 3 19-2522, When
It Failed To Sua Sponfe Order A Mental Health Evaluation
Of Mr. Jockumsen Prior To Sentencing.................................................... 15
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................

24

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING............................................................................... 25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Esfelle v. Smith. 451 U.S. 454 (1981) ................................................................. 0
Esfrada v. Stafe. 143 Idaho 558. 149 P.3d 833 (2006) .......................................10
State v. Banbury. 145 Idaho 265. 178 P.3d 630 (Ct. App . 2007) ........................19
State v. Collins. 144 Idaho 408. 162 P.3d 787 (Ct. App . 2007) ...........................15
Sfafe v. Coonfs. 137 Idaho 150. 44 P.3d 1205 (Ct. App . 2002) .......................... 15
Sfafe v. Cope. 142 Idaho 492. 129 P.3d 1241 (2006) ......................................... 1
State v. Craner. 137 Idaho 188. 45 P.3d 844 (Ct. App . 2002) .............................15
Sfafe v. Durham. 146 Idaho 364. 195 P.3d 723 (Ct. App . 2008) ......................... 16
State v. McFarland. 125 Idaho 876. 876 P.2d 158 (Ct. App . 1994).....................15
Sfafe v. Rodriguez. 132 Idaho 261. 262 n.l. 971 P.2d 327 (Ct. App . 1998) .......14
Statutes
I.C. § 18-211(~)
...................................................................................................20
I.C. 3 18-215 ....................................................................................................... 1

I.C. § 19-2522(3)........................................................................................... 21, 23
I.C. §§ 18-210-212 .............................................................................................. 20
Other Authorities

http://www.seroquel.com/bipolar-disorder/about-seroquel/what-is-seroquel.aspx

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After being initially deemed incompetent to stand trial, and subsequently
receiving treatment for schizophrenia and being determined to be competent, Michael
Jockumsen pleaded guilty to attempted strangulation. Mr. Jockumsen's competency
evaluations, performed pursuant to I.C. § 18-211, were appended to the Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) and were further referenced multiple times during
the sentencing hearings conducted by the district court.
Despite acknowledging a lack of information regarding the degree to which
Mr. Jockumsen's mental illness contributed to his offense or to his potential risk to the
community, the district court did not order a mental health evaluation pursuant to
I.C. § 19-2522 prior to sentencing. Rather, the court sentenced Mr. Jockumsen to eight
years, with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. The court further provided Mr.
Jockumsen's competency evaluations, along with other materials, to a psychiatrist from
the Department of Correction during the period of retained jurisdiction, and asked the
psychiatrist to draw an opinion from these materials with regard to Mr. Jockumsen's
prognosis and suitability for probation. The district court subsequently relinquished
jurisdiction.
Mr. Jockumsen timely appeals from the district court's order relinquishing
jurisdiction, and asserts that the district court's use of his competency evaluations at
sentencing and the rider review hearing was an abuse of discretion and constituted a
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and compelled
testimony.

Additionally, Mr. Jockumsen submits that the district court abused its

discretion and acted in manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32, when the court failed to sua
sponfe order a mental health evaluation in accordance with I.C. Cj 19-2522.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
Mr. Jockumsen was charged with second degree kidnapping and attempted
strangulation. (R., pp.48-49.)

Pursuant to an oral motion by defense counsel, the

district court ordered an evaluation pursuant to I.C. Cj 18-211 to determine whether
Mr. Jockumsen was competent to stand trial. (R., pp.34-35.)
Based on Dr. John Christensen's determination that Mr. Jockumsen was not
competent to stand trial, the district court ordered Mr. Jockumsen's commitment for 90
days pending a determination of whether Mr. Jockumsen would be fit to stand trial in the
foreseeable future. (R., pp.42-43.) The district court also ordered Dr. Christensen to
conduct a follow-up evaluation to determine whether Mr. Jockumsen was competent to
stand trial several weeks later. (R., pp.53-54.)
The district court held a hearing with regard to this second competency
evaluation. (2114107 ~ r . ' ,p.5, L.5 - p.18, L.24.) The court heard telephonic testimony
from Dr. Christensen, who testified that Mr. Jockumsen was competent for purposes of
standing trial and entering a guilty plea. (2114107 Tr., 7, L.25 - p.14, L.6, p.14, Ls.3-6.)
Dr. Christensen testified that his latest evaluation of Mr. Jockumsen's competency
indicated that he was malingering, and that he had the capacity to understand the
proceedings against him at the time of the hearing. (2114107 Tr., p.8, L.3

- p.9, L.14.)

Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings, for ease of
reference, citations to the transcripts in this case will be made with regard to the date on
which the proceedings occurred.

However, Dr. Christensen did note that Mr. Jockumsen's "psychiatric state" could vaiy
in its impacts on Mr. Jockumsen's behavior or understanding over time.
Tr., p.9, Ls.15-21.)
Dr. Christensen.

(2114107

Counsel for Mr. Jockumsen did not challenge the findings of
(2114107 Tr., p.15, Ls.16-17.)

The district court found that

Mr. Jockumsen was competent. (2/14107 Tr., p.17, L.15 - p.18, L.24.)
At this same hearing, Mr. Jockumsen entered a guilty plea to attempted
strangulation. (2114107 Tr., p.20, L.8 - p.21, L.7, p.33, Ls.9-16.) In exchange, the State
dismissed its allegation of kidnapping. (2114107 Tr., p.21, L.12 - p.22, L.9.) Appended
to the PSI that was prepared for this case were all of the competency evaluations that
were performed pursuant to I.C. 3 18-211. (PSI, pp.17-39.')
During the initial sentencing hearing, one of the main points of contention was
the degree to which Mr. Jockumsen's mental illness was a factor at sentencing and how
this factor should influence the court's sentencing determination. (413107 Tr., p.36, L.24

- p.62, L.3.) The district court acknowledged that mental illness was an issue that it
should consider in this case. (413107 Tr., p.37, Ls.20-21.) Mr. Jockumsen, through
counsel, repeatedly asserted that his mental illness was a contributing factor to his
underlying offense, such that it had a material impact on Mr. Jockumsen's underlying
culpability for his crime. (413107 Tr., p.38, L.7 - p.39, L.21.) However, the district court
cut off Mr. Jockumsen's argument regarding the degree to which his condition
contributed to his offense. (413107 Tr., p.39, Ls.22-25.)

*

For ease of reference, unnumbered pages of the PSI are hand-numbered
consecutively, beginning at page 17.

Mr. Jockumsen also personally testified to the fact that his psychosis was a
predominate factor in triggering his underlying offense in this case. (413107 Tr., p.42,
Ls.11-19.) He also provided additional information about his personal struggles with
mental illness for a significant period of his adult life, and as to the benefits to his mental
health now that he was taking appropriate medications to treat his mental illness.
(413107 Tr., p.45, Ls.18-20, p.46, Ls.15-21, p.47, L.23 - p.48, L.1.)
The district court acknowledged the sentencing factors regarding appropriate
considerations of a defendant's mental health conditions found in I.C. § 19-2523.
(413107 Tr., p.51, Ls.19-22.) However, the district court relied on information contained
in evaluations performed to assess Mr. Jockumsen's competency to stand trial in finding
that there was conflicting evidence regarding his mental illness and whether he could be
malingering. (413107 Tr., p.53, Ls.2-20.) The district court also explicitly referenced the
contents of a competency evaluation performed by Dr. Christensen in February, 2007,
including some of Mr. Jockumsen's statements made during the course of the
competency evaluation, as part of its consideration on the record at the initial
sentencing hearing.

(413107 Tr., p.56, Ls.4-12.)

Although the court believed that

Mr. Jockumsen posed a potential risk to society, the district court also admitted, "It's just
difficult for me to measure just how great that risk is. So it's worrisome to me." (413107
Tr., p.54, Ls.21-24.)
Despite the court's own acknowledgement of the centrality of Mr. Jockumsen's
mental health issues to the pertinent considerations of fashioning an appropriate
sentence, the district court did not sua sponte order a mental health evaluation pursuant
to I.C. § 19-2522. Instead, the district court continued the sentencing hearing in order to

contact someone with Department of Correction to see whether they could perform a
psychological assessment of Mr. Jockumsen during his period of retained jurisdiction.
(413107 Tr., p.61, Ls.2-18.) And, despite a lack of a psychological evaluation prepared
for purposes of sentencing, the district court announced its intention to impose a prison
sentence. (413107 Tr., p. 16, 1s. 19-23.)
At the second sentencing hearing, the district court revealed that it had attempted
to get in touch with Dr. Mary perrien3, a staff psychiatrist with the Department of
Correction, in order to obtain more information about an assessment of
Mr. Jockumsen's mental health conditions specifically for purposes of sentencing.
(419107 Tr., p. 4, Ls.14-19.)

The district court then indicated that it intended upon

imposing sentence and retaining jurisdiction, but would ask for the Department of
Correction to provide additional information regarding Mr. Jockumsen's mental health
for use at the rider review hearing. (419107 Tr., p.6, Ls.19-25.)
The State objected to the district court retaining jurisdiction, asserting, "I think
that just because he has a mental health - I guess some questions about his mental
health, I think that can still be addressed at prison."

(419J07 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-17.)

Mr. Jockumsen argued in favor of the court retaining jurisdiction. (419107 Tr., p.9, Ls. 1018.)
The district court again noted its difficulties in assessing Mr. Jockumsen's
potential risk to the community in light of his significant mental health problems. The
court stated:

It appears that Dr. Perrien's name is misspelled in the transcript for the second
sentencing hearing. (See, e.g., 419107 Tr., p.4, L.20; Letter to district court from
Dr. Perrien, dated August 3, 2007.)

The fact of the matter is that right now, Mr. Jockumsen, you are a risk to
the community. What I'm having trouble getting my arms around is
whether it's because that's a result of your criminal thinking or whether it's
the result of issues of mental illness or whether it's some combination of
the two.
(419107 Tr., p.14, Ls.15-21.) However, the district court was apparently unaware of the
provisions of I.C. $j19-2522, since the court when on to state that, "The only way I can
know whether [release into the community] is appropriate is to wait and see how you
might do in the retained jurisdiction setting and wait and see what the Department of
Correction's psychiatrist may have to say about your mental health issues." (419107
Tr., p.16, Ls.7-12.)
The district court proceeded to sentence Mr. Jockumsen to eight years, with
three years fixed, for his guilty plea to attempted strangulation. (419107 Tr., p.17, Ls.14.)

After announcing Mr. Jockumsen's sentence, the district court then retained

jurisdiction and stated its intentions with regards to obtaining more information regarding
Mr. Jockumsen's mental health conditions. (4/9/07 Tr., p.19, L.12

- p.20,

L.4.) The

court indicated that it would send Mr. Jockumsen's prior competency evaluations to
Dr. Perrien to be considered in conducting the mental health evaluation of
Mr. Jockumsen. (419107 Tr., p.19, Ls.13-19.) The court further indicated that it would
ask Dr. Perrien to provide the court with any opinions regarding Mr. Jockumsen's
mental health and whether he could be successful in a supervised probation setting.
(419107 Tr., p.19, L.20 - p.20, L.4.) Neither Mr. Jockumsen nor the State objected to the
district court retaining jurisdiction prior to obtaining a mental health evaluation pursuant
to I.C. § 19-2522. (419107 Tr., p.20, Ls.5-8.)

At the rider review hearing, the district court gave substantial consideration both
to the prior competency evaluations and to the letter drafted by Dr. Perrien that was
based, in large part, on the competency evaluations. (8127107 Tr., p.30, Ls.9-23.) The
court also considered the Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report
(hereinafier, APSI), which recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction.
(8127107 Tr., p.7, L.13 - p.1 I , L.18; APSI, p.4.) Mr. Jockumsen argued that many of his
disciplinary issues while he was serving his rider were attributable to the fact that he
was not receiving medication at the time. (8127107 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-18.) He also asserted
that, with proper treatment, he could be safely placed on probation. (8127107 Tr., p.13,
L.24 - p.15, L.6.)
The district court relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Jockumsen's case and
executed his original sentence of eight years, with three years fixed. (8127107 Tr., p.34,
Ls.13-19; R., pp.75-77.) In describing the court's conclusions in support of its decision
to relinquish jurisdiction, the district court relied heavily both on the evaluations
conducted to determine Mr. Jockumsen's competency to stand trial, and on
Dr. Perrien's letter that was also largely predicated on the competency evaluations.
(8127107 Tr., p.30, Ls.9-23, p.33, L.20 - p.34, L.5.) Mr. Jockumsen timely appeals from
the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction and executing his sentence. (R., p.79.)

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion and violate Mr. Jockumsen's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and I.C. § 18-215, when it
improperly used information obtained for purposes of determining
Mr. Jockumsen's competency at sentencing?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion and act in manifest disregard for the
pertinent provisions of I.C.R. 32 and the requirements of I.C. 9 19-2522, when it
failed to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation of Mr. Jockumsen prior to
sentencing?

ARGUMENT

The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Violated Mr. Jockumsen's Fifth

f

i

Used Information Obtained For Purposes Of Determinina Mr. Jockumsen's Comuetency
At Sentencing
A.

Introduction
Mr. Jockumsen asserts that the district court improperly considered his

statements, and the medical conclusions based directly upon these statements,
contained within his competency evaluation for purposes of aggravation at sentencing.
A defendant has a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination that applies to
statements made in the course of competency evaluations. It is a violation of the
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights to use his statements, made in the context of a
competency evaluation, against him at sentencing in absence of appropriate warnings
and a valid waiver by the defendant at the time of the competency examination. In
addition, under I.C. § 18-215, the defendant's statements in competency evaluations
cannot be used against the defendant at sentencing in absence of a valid waiver.
The district court's use of the competency evaluations, and Mr. Jockumsen's
statements therein, against Mr. Jockumsen at sentencing violated both constitutional
and statutory standards attendant on the court's use of discretion. Moreover, the failure
of the district court to excise the information from the competency evaluations that were
attached to and incorporated within the presentence report likewise constituted an
abuse of the court's discretion.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Violated Mr. Jockumsen's Fifth
Amendment Riuhts Aqainst Self-Incrimination And I.C. S 18-215, When It
Considered Statements Made By Mr. Jockumsen, And Diaclnoses That Were
Made Based Upon His Statements, In Aggravation At Sentencing
Use of a defendant's statements made during the course of a competency

evaluation may not constitutionally be considered by the trial court in aggravation at
sentencing in absence of a warning to the defendant that he has a Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent at the time the competency evaluation is performed. Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-474 (1981).

The Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination applies in the context of psychological evaluations, including competency
evaluations. Id. at 465; see also Esfrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 563, $49 P.3d 833,
838 (2006). Moreover, where a medical diagnosis from a competency evaluation is
partly predicated on the statements of the defendant, that diagnosis should likewise not
be considered at sentencing. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 464. In particular, the Court in Estelle
highlighted that it was improper to introduce at sentencing the competency evaluator's
conclusion that the defendant lacked remorse because this determination, and the
overall assessment of future dangerousness contained within the competency
examination, was based on the defendant's own statements that he made in absence of
a warning of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Id. While such unwarned
statements can be used for the limited purpose of establishing competency, they cannot
be used in aggravation at sentencing. Id. at 468-469.
Such a use of information obtained in the course of conducting competency
evaluations also runs afoul of the provisions of I.C. § 18-215. This statute provides, in
pertinent part, that statements made by a person during a psychological or psychiatric
exam ordered pursuant to I.C. § 18-211, "shall not be admissible in evidence in any

criminal proceeding against [the defendant] on any issue other than the defendant's
ability to assist counsel at trial or to form any specific intent which is an element of the
crime charged, except that such statements of a defendant to a psychiatrist or
psychologist as are relevant for impeachment purposes may be received subject to the
usual rules of evidence governing matters of impeachment." I.C. § 18-215.
In interpreting this provision, the ldaho Supreme Court has held that it constitutes
an abuse of discretion if information and statements from a competency evaluation are
improperly relied upon at sentencing. State v. Cope, 142 ldaho 492, 499, 129 P.3d
1241, 1248 (2006). "Ultimately, the determination of whether a particular sentence is an
abuse of discretion depends upon the information that is used in framing the sentence."
Id. While the Court in Cope found that the improperly included information from the

competency evaluations did not infect the sentence, the same cannot be said in this
case. Id. at 500-501, 129 P.3d at 1249-1250.
Here, the district court plainly sought information for use in fashioning a sentence
directly from the competency evaluations themselves, and a letter from Dr. Perrien that
was expressly based upon the competency evaluations, at the initial sentencing
hearings and at Mr. Jockumsen's rider review hearing. The court considered these
evaluations directly at Mr. Jockumsen's initial sentencing hearing. (413107 Tr., p.53,
Ls.2-13, p.56, Ls.4-12.) The court also sent copies of the competency evaluations to
Dr. Perrien to use as the basis for an evaluation on her part regarding how
Mr. Jockumsen's mental health issues should impact on his sentencing, particularly with
regard to his potential placement on probation. (419107 Tr., p.19, L.13 - p.20, L.4.) A
review of Dr. Perrien's letter in response to the court's request reveals that she did not

undertake a separate evaluation of Mr. Jockumsen, but rather formed her opinions
based upon the documentary materials provided her by the district court. (Letter to the
district court from Dr. Perrien, dated August 3, 2007.) These materials were the sum
and substance of the evidence relied on by the district court to evaluate
Mr. Jockumsen's mental health conditions at the rider review hearing.

(8127107

Tr., p.30, Ls.9-23.)
Unlike Cope, where there was expert testimony at sentencing regarding the
defendant's mental health conditions that was wholly independent of the competency
evaluations, there was no source of information in this case on Mr. Jockumsen's mental
health conditions that was not fatally infected with improper reliance on the inadmissible
competence evaluations and Mr. Jockumsen's statements therein.

See Cope, 142

ldaho at 500-502, 129 P.3d at 1249-1251. As such, the district court abused its
discretion when the court improperly relied on the information contained in
Mr. Jockumsen's competency evaluation as aggravating evidence at sentencing.
C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Violated Mr. Jockumsen's Fifth
Amendment Rishts Aqainst Self-Incrimination and I.C. Ij 'f8-215, When The
Court Failed To Remove Mr. Jockumsen's Competency Evaluations That Were
lmproperlv Included Within The Presentence lnvestiqation Report
As previously noted, it is unconstitutional to use a defendant's statements, made

without warning of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, in
aggravation at sentencing.

In this case, not only did the district court improperly

considered this information in aggravation at sentencing, but the district court also failed
to remove this information that was improperly included within Mr. Jockumsen's PSI. As
the ldaho Supreme Court noted in Cope, the improper inclusion of competency

evaluations or statements therefrom in presentence investigation reports may constitute
an abuse of discretion if this evidence infects the sentence. Cope, 142 Idaho at 500,
129 P.3d at 1249.
Mr. Jockumsen's competency evaluations were appended to the PSI in this case.
(PSI, pp.17-39.)

In addition, the presentence investigator commented directly on

Mr. Jockumsen's statements made during the course of his competency evaluation as
part of the factual background of this case and Mr. Jockumsen's social history. (PSI,
pp.9, 10.)

The evaluator discussed at length the substance of Mr. Jockumsen's

competency evaluations with regard to his overall mental health conditions. (PSI,
pp.11-13.) Also of note is the fact that the presentence investigator presented only the
conclusions indicating that Mr. Jockumsen was "malingering" for purposes of the
competency determination from the prior competency examinations, and further
misrepresented one of Mr. Jockumsen's anti-psychosis medications as treating
insomnia in the section addressing the investigator's analysis and comments on the
defendant's condition. (PSI, p.15; see also Point I1infra.)
The investigator never mentioned that Mr. Jockumsen was actively receiving
treatment for schizophrenia while being assessed for competency, or that the
psychiatric evaluations continued to recognize that Mr. Jockumsen may suffer from
psychosis. (PSI, pp.14-15, 21-22, 28, 32, 39.) As such, not only did the presentence
investigator improperly and extensively rely on the competency evaluations in reaching
her conclusions in this case, but the investigator also appears to have selectively
presented only that information from the evaluations that was harmful to Mr. Jockumsen
at sentencing,

The Court of Appeals in State v. Rodriguez has aptly noted how information
improperly contained in presentence investigation reports has the potential to prejudice
a defendant beyond the district court's immediate sentencing decision.

Sfate v.

Rodriguez, 132 ldaho 261, 262 n.1, 971 P.2d 327, 328 (Ct. App. 1998). The Rodriguez
court observed:
The use of a PSI does not end with the defendant's sentencing. The
report goes to the Department of Corrections and may be considered by
the Commission of Pardons and Parole in evaluating the defendant's
suitability for parole. See I.C.R. 32(h). In addition, if the defendant
reoffends, any prior PSI is usually presented to the sentencing court with
an update report from the presentence investigator. Thus, a PSI follows a
defendant indefinitely, and information inappropriately included therein
may prejudice the defendant even if the initial sentencing court
disregarded such information.

Id.
In the case, the potential for Mr. Jockumsen's statements made in the course of
his competency evaluations, the conclusions of the evaluators that flowed therefrom,
and the selective referencing of these reports by the presentence investigator, have the
potential for repeated future violations of Mr. Jockumsen's Fifth Amendment rights. This
information was improperly included in his presentence investigation report, and has
every potential be used against Mr. Jockurnsen when it comes to his ability to obtain
release on parole.

As noted by the Rodriquez Court, this information follows

Mr. Jockurnsen indefinitely. Rodriguez, 132 ldaho at 262 n. I,971 P.2d at 328. In light
of this, the district court abused its discretion, and failed to act in accordance with
I.C.

3 18-215, when the court failed to remove Mr. Jockumsen's competency

evaluations, and references to the contents of the evaluations, from the PSI.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Acted In Manifest Disreaard of I.C.R. 32
and I.C. 5 19-2522, When It Failed To Sua Sponfe Order A Mental Health Evaluation Of
Mr. Jockumsen Prior To Sentencing
The decision whether to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 192522 is discretionary with the district court. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 144 ldaho 408,
409, 162 P.3d 787, 788 (Ct. App. 2007). However, as with any exercise of discretion,
the district court's determination must be consistent with applicable legal standards.
State V. Coonfs, 137 ldaho 150, 152, 44 P.3d 1205, 1207 (Ct. App. 2002). "The legal
standards governing the court's decision whether to order a psychological evaluation
and report are contained in I.C. § 19-2522." Collins, 144 ldaho at 409, 162 P.3d at 788.
ldaho Code § 19-2522 provides that a mental health evaluation is mandatory, rather
than discretionary, if there is reason to believe that the mental condition of the
defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown. Coonfs,
137 ldaho at 152, 44 P.3d at 1207; State v. McFarland, 125 ldaho 876, 879, 876 P.2d
158, 161 (Ct. App. 1994). This Court will uphold the failure of the district court to order
a mental health evaluation if the record supports the finding that there was no reason to
believe that the defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing
or if the information already before the district court meets the requirements of I.C. § 192522. State v. Craner, 137 ldaho 188, 189,45 P.3d 844, 845 (Ct. App. 2002).
Admittedly, Mr. Jockumsen did not object to the lack of a psychological
evaluation in accordance with I.C. § 19-2522 prior to the district court retaining
jurisdiction in this case. However, it is well recognized that a district court may be under
an independent duty to order a mental health evaluation under I.C. § 19-2522 under

certain circumstances, even in absence of a request on the part of the defendant. "A
claim that the district court abused its discretion by failing to sua sponfe order a
psychological evaluation of a defendant before sentencing can be made on appeal
without an objection to the lack of an evaluation or a request for an evaluation before
the district court." State

v. Durham, 146 ldaho 364, 366, 195 P.3d 723, 725 (Ct. App.

2008). If the defendant does not object to the failure of the district court to order a
mental health evaluation, the defendant must demonstrate that the district court
manifestly disregarded the relevant provisions of I.C.R. 32 by failing to order the
psychological examination. Id. This Court generally looks to the information contained
within, or omitted from, the Presentence Investigation Report to identify the need for a
psychological evaluation. Collins, 144 ldaho at 409, 162 P.3d at 788.
If the court's comments indicate that it found the defendant's mental condition
and rehabilitative potential to be significant factors, and the district court nonetheless
proceeds to sentencing "without the benefit of a professional diagnosis of that condition
and prognosis for improvement," this is a factor that supports the finding that there is
reason to believe that the mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at
sentencing. Mcfarland, 125 ldaho at 881, 876 P.2d at 163. Here, the record is replete
with the district court's acknowledgement of the importance of Mr. Jockumsen's mental
health conditions to its sentencing determination, as well as the recognition that the
court was without necessary information in order to properly determine how
Mr. Jockumsen's mental illness should impact his sentence.
At the initial sentencing hearing, the district court expressly stated that
Mr. Jockumsen's mental illness was an issue that the court felt it should consider.

(413107 Tr., p.37, Ls.20-21.) The court also noted the statutory criteria provided in
I.C. § 19-2523 regarding consideration of the defendant's mental conditions at
sentencing. (413107 Tr., p.51, Ls.19-22.)
Despite knowing that Mr. Jockumsen's mental conditions were relevant and
should be given weight at sentencing, the district court also made several statements
indicating that it was without the necessary information at the time of sentencing to
determine precisely how Mr. Jockumsen's conditions should effect his sentence. The
court noted that the evidence of Mr. Jockumsen's mental conditions were "somewhat
ambiguous," and not always consistent. (413107 Tr., p.53, Ls.2-20.) Despite a sense
that Mr. Jockumsen may pose a danger to the community, the court also acknowledged,
"It's just difficult for me to measure just how great that risk is. So it's worrisome to me."
(413107 Tr., p.54, Ls.21-24.) The district court reiterated this concern at the subsequent
sentencing hearing, where the court stated: "The fact of the matter is that right now,
Mr. Jockumsen, you are a risk to the community. What I'm having trouble getting my
arms around is whether it's because that's a result of your criminal thinking or whether
it's the result of issues of mental illness or whether it's some combination of the two."
(419107 Tr., p.14, Ls.15-21.)
Beyond the district court's own explicit acknowledgment that Mr. Jockumsen's
mental health conditions were a central factor at sentencing, and the extensive
argument presented by Mr. Jockumsen and the State regarding how Mr. Jockumsen's
mental health conditions should impact the court's sentencing decision, other factors in
this case demonstrate that his mental condition was a significant factor at sentencing.

Mr. Jockumsen's prior criminal record reveals no past crimes of violence until
approximately one month prior to the charge at issue in this appeal. (PSI, pp.4-6.) His
prior offenses were mainly charges of petit theft and driving under the influence. (PSI,
pp.4-6.) This sudden escalation from relatively petty crimes to allegations of a series of
violent offenses is an important indication of the need for a mental health evaluation.
See Durham, 146 ldaho at 367, 195 P.3d at 726; Collins, 144 ldaho at 409, 162 P.3d at
788; Craner, 137 ldaho at 190, 45 P.3d at 846; McFarland, 125 ldaho at 880, 876 P.2d
at 162.
As has been noted by the court in Coonfs, the court's awareness from an early
stage in the proceedings that the defendant suffered from a serious mental illness,
coupled with an awareness that the defendant was receiving medications to treat that
illness, is also sufficient to alert the court that the defendant's mental condition would be
an important consideration at sentencing. Coonfs, 137 ldaho at 152-153, 44 P.3d at
1207-1208. Here, the court knew at a very early stage that Mr. Jockumsen had mental
health issues, because Mr. Jockumsen's counsel asked that he be evaluated for
competency at a preliminary hearing, and there were questions of his competency that
persisted during the initial stages of this criminal case. (R., pp.32, 34-36, 40, 42-44, 5354, 62-63.)

Moreover, there was significant evidence before the district court at

sentencing that Mr. Jockumsen was receiving anti-psychosis medications.

(413107

Tr.,p.47,L.23-p.48,L.l;4/9/07Tr.,p.10,Ls.10-16;PSI,pp.12,15,28.)
Mr. Jockumsen's own statements also indicated the need for a mental health
evaluation.

Mr. Jockumsen repeatedly expressed the belief that evil witchcraft or

sorcery was the cause of the commission of his crimes. (8127107 Tr., p.23, L.25

- p.24,

L.8; p.27, Ls.12-18.) He also has consistently maintained that his current offense was
the result of a psychotic break when he was not adequately medicated for his mental
illness. (413107 Tr., p.42, Ls.16-19, p.45, Ls.18-20; 4/9/07 Tr., p.10, Ls.10-16.)
While the record clearly demonstrates that there was every reason to believe that
Mr. Jockumsen suffered from severe mental health issues, nothing in the record
otherwise met with the requirements for the types of informed considerations that must
be made pursuant to I.C.

3 19-2522(3).

As an initial matter, it should be noted that the district court's decision to order a
mental health evaluation from the Department of Correction has already been held not
to satisfy the mandate of I.C. § 19-2522. Coonts, 137 ldaho at 153, 44 P.3d at 1208. In
Coonts, the court held:
Section 19-2522 does not require a psychological evaluation merely to
enlighten officials who must make decisions on the defendant's conditions
of confinement and treatment while incarcerated; the statute requires that
the evaluation be conducted before sentencing so that the trial court will
have the benefit of the evaluator's insights inWfashioningan appropriate
sentence.

Id.

(See also 4/3/07 Tr., p.57, Ls.11-19.)

in addition, the letter provided from

Dr. Perrien addresses none of the factors required under I.C. § 19-2522(3), and
therefore cannot provide an adequate basis in the record to excuse the court's failure to
order a proper mental health evaluation. (Letter to the district court from Dr. Perrien,
dated August 3,2007.)
Likewise, the competency evaluations in this case cannot stand as a substitute
for a mental health evaluation conducted for purposes of sentencing pursuant to
I.C. § 19-2522. See State v. Banbury, 145 ldaho 265,270, 178 P.3d 630,635 (Ct. App.
2007). First, as has been noted, such a use of the contents of a competency evaluation

at sentencing violates Mr. Jockumsen's Fifth Amendment rights, as well as the
expressed provisions of I.C. § 18-215. See Point I supra; Banbury, 145 ldaho at 270,
178 P.3d at 635. Second, the district court apparently felt that the information contained
within these reports was insufficient to address sentencing concerns, as the court
requested an additional report from Dr. Perrien while Mr. Jockumsen was on his rider.
See Banbury, 145 ldaho at 270, 178 P.3d at 635. (419107 Tr., p.16, Ls.7-12.)
Finally, competency evaluations are conducted to determine fundamentally
different questions, and thus will address fundamentally different concerns, than mental
health evaluations conducted for sentencing purposes under I.C.

19-2522.

Competency evaluations serve the purpose of determining whether the defendant may
legally be subjected to any trial, conviction, sentencing, or punishment at all.

See

I.C. §§ 18-210-212. As such, the diagnostic thrust of competency evaluations looks to
whether the defendant has the "capacity to understand the proceedings against him and
to assist in his own defense." I . . 18-211 ) However, "psychological evaluations to
determine a defendant's competence to stand trial or aid in his defense conducted
pursuant to I.C. 18-211 often will be insufficient to inform the court's sentencing decision
because they will not address the factors delineated in I.C. 19-2522(3)." Banbury, 145
ldaho at 270, 178 P.3d at 635. The analysis of the defendant's diagnosed conditions
under I.C. § 19-2522 focuses instead on factors relevant to appropriate punishment,
such as the degree of the defendant's illness and level of impairment, which may impact
upon the defendant's overall culpability for the offense; the available treatments for his
condition, along with the risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment; and a
consideration of the risk of danger that the defendant might pose if released back into

the community.

I.C. § 19-2522(3).

As such, the inclusion of the competency

evaluations within the PSI in this case cannot be said to constitute sufficient compliance
with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3).
In addition to the improper inclusion of Mr. Jockumsen's competency evaluations,
the presentence evaluator also appears to have misinformed the district court within the
PSI regarding the actual indications of Mr. Jockumsen's medications for his psychosis.
The investigator stated within this report that, "It should be note (sic), though Michael
reports he is taking Seroquel for schizophrenia, Dr. Christianson's (sic) reported dated
February 1, 2007, indicates 'Sleep is nonproblematic with prescription Seroquel."' (PSI,
p.12.) Apparently interpreting this remark to mean that Seroquel's primary or sole
indication was for insomnia, the evaluator then asserted, "He claimed he is taking the
medication Seroquel for [schizophrenialpsychosis]; however, psychological records
indicate this medication is for sleep." (PSI, p.15.)
In actuality, Seroquel is prescribed for the treatment of psychosis, just as
Mr. Jockumsen had indicated. See http://www.seroquel.comlbipolar-disorder/aboutseroquel/what-is-seroquel.aspx. Mr. Jockumsen was also prescribed Zyprexa during
his period of involuntary commitment, which is indicated for treatment of schizophrenia.
See http://www.zyprexa.com/index.jsp. (PSI, p.28.)

It is precisely this lack of informed

analysis of Mr. Jockumsen's conditions and available treatments that demonstrates why
a proper mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C.

3 19-2522 was required in this case.

In its absence, the district court was left to rely on incomplete data and incorrect
assumptions of fact on perhaps the most central issue bearing on the court's sentencing
decision in this case.

It should also be noted that, while the APSI recommended that the district court
relinquish jurisdiction, the ultimate recommendation of the evaluator was that, "Mr.
Jockumsen would benefit from a long-term inpatient treatment program." (APSI, p.4.) A
recommendation for treatment contained within a Presentence Investigation Report
supports the determination that a mental health evaluation, which includes a discussion
of available treatments and their efficacy, was needed in this case. Durham, 146 Idaho
at 368, 195 P.3d at 727.
The record also contains several references to Mr. Jockumsen's significant family
history of mental illness, as well as past commitments to psychiatric institutions for
treatment of his mental conditions. (413107 Tr., p.46, Ls.15-21; PSI, pp.4, 11-12.) This
is further evidence that demonstrated the need for a mental health evaluation in this
case, both to determine the degree to which Mr. Jockumsen's mental illness impacted
upon his culpability for his offense and to determine the potential effectiveness of
treatments to prevent similar criminal behaviors in the future.
However, the evidence before the district court at sentencing failed to address
nearly all of the critical factors that are required to be included within a mental health
evaluation for sentencing purposes. Under I.C. § 19-2522(3), the psychological report
a description of
ordered by the district court must include the following information: (I)
the nature of the examination; (2) a diagnosis, evaluation, or prognosis of the mental
condition of the defendant; (3) an analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or
defect and level of functional impairment; (4) a consideration of whether treatment is
available for the defendant's mental condition; (5) an analysis of the relative risks and
benefits of treatment or non-treatment; and (6) a consideration of the risk of danger

which the defendant may create for the public if at large. I.C. § 19-2522(3). The record
relied on by the district court did not adequate meet these requirements, and failed to
even address several of the key elements of the statutory requirements.
Noticeably absent from the record was any substantive discussion of the degree
to which Mr. Jockumsen's mental conditions may have altered or impaired his mental
functioning. Given that Mr. Jockumsen had no record of violent criminal charges until
approximately one month prior to the charge at issue in this appeal, an analysis of the
degree to which Mr. Jockumsen's mental illness may have interfered with his selfcontrol and contributed to his criminal behavior is an especially important consideration.
As important, there was no evaluation of what treatments were potentially
available to Mr. Jockumsen in order to address his mental conditions, or any evaluation
of the potential risk to the public if Mr. Jockumsen were to receive mental health
treatment in lieu of incarceration. The information provided to the district court prior to
sentencing made it very clear that there was reason to believe that Mr. Jockumsen's
mental conditions would be a significant factor at sentencing.

However, this

information, on its own, did not adequately meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3).
In light of this, the district court acted with manifest disregard for the provisions of I.C.R.
32 when it failed to order a psychological report for sentencing purposes.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Jockumsen respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence, and
remand his case for a new sentencing hearing after a complete evaluation of
Mr. Jockumsen's mental health conditions is made in accordance with I.C. § 19-2522
and I.C.R. 32. Further, he requests that this Court remand his case to the district court
with instructions to order a new presentence investigation report that omits the contents
and conclusions of his competency evaluations, and further instruct the district court to
forward the new presentence report to the Department of Correction. In the alternative,
he asks that this Court reverse the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction and
remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 24thday of April, 2009.
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